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DISREGARD OF CORPORATE ENTITY
FOR THE TAXPAYER'S BENEFIT:
A CASE STUDY
David L. Samuels*
At least since the days of Gregory v. Helvering' it has been well
established that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may "disre-
gard the corporate entity" whenever it appears that on the basis
of "form v. substance" this is necessary to effectuate the policies
of the Internal Revenue Code. This is commonly considered a one-
way street, favoring only the Commissioner and never favoring
the taxpayer. The reasoning is that the taxpayer is free to choose
the form in which he does business, and that having elected the
corporate form, he cannot complain at having to bear the burden
resulting from the election.2 However, there are cases which contro-
vert this assumption that the corporate entity will be disregarded
only for the benefit of the Commissioner. The purpose of this
article is to study some of these cases in an attempt to ascertain
the attitudes of :the courts and to determine the situations where
the taxpayer may disregard the corporate entity for his own benefit.'
SHAM CORPORATIONS-No BUSINESS PURPOSE OR ACTIVITY
In Moline Properties Inc. v. Commissioner4 a corporation
sought to have its capital gains taxed to its sole shareholder and its
corporate existence ignored for income tax purposes. Although this
position was sustained by the Board of Tax Appeals,5 the decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.' The
Circuit Court stated that since the taxpayer had "chosen the corpo-
rate form to conduct these affairs," both the shareholder and the
corporation "must accept the tax disadvantages of the plan." The
* LL.B., 1936, Hastings College of Law; Member, California Bar, private prac-
tice, Palo Alto, California.
1 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
2 United States v. Morris & Essex R.R. Co., 135 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 754 (1943); Moline Properties Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436
(1943) ; Skarda v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1957).
3 District Court decisions have been disregarded.
4 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
5 45 B.T.A. 647 (1941).
6 131 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1942).
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decision of the Circuit Court was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court. 7
Had the Supreme Court gone no further, it is unlikely that there
would have been any problem, and there would have been no reason
for this paper. In fact, however, the opinion of the Supreme Court
took most of the effectiveness out of the wording quoted because
the Court relied heavily on the business activities of the corporation
to justify its conclusion that the corporation's separateness as a tax
entity could not be disregarded. In this connection it stated:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in business
life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the
state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands of
creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience,
so long as that purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is
followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corpora-
tion remains a separate taxable entity.8
As will be noted below, subsequent cases have affirmed the posi-
tion that the corporate entity will be disregarded if the corporation
is not formed for a "business" purpose, engages in no business ac-
tivity and is merely a sham created for the convenience of its share-
holders. However, there do not appear to be very clear rules as to
when this theory will be invoked. Since several of the decisions
seem to be inconsistent, decisions subsequent to the Moline case
will be reviewed and an attempt made to analyze them. Only deci-
sions in which it was the taxpayer who sought to have the corporate
entity disregarded will be considered.
Taxpayer Successful
In Paymer v. Commissioner' some quite clear lines were drawn.
Two brothers had been operating as partners. In an attempt to con-
ceal assets from the creditors of one of them, they formed two
corporations and conveyed a separate parcel of real estate to each.
The minutes of the organizational meeting of each corporation stated
that conveyances to it were made only so that the corporation could
hold title, beneficial interest being reserved to the two partner-
shareholders, since the corporation had been formed for their con-
venience. No meetings other than the organizational meeting were
held, and no officers or directors were elected subsequent to that
meeting. Since they did not bother to assign to the corporations the
outstanding leases in favor of tenants, the tenants of each of the
7 Note the prior inconsistent decisions of Circuit. 319 U.S. 436 (1943). Courts of
Appeal are cited in footnote 1 to the Supreme Court decision. See footnote 21 infra.
8 Id. at 438-9.
9 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
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buildings continued to treat the individuals as the owners of the
property. The two individuals managed the real estate parcels,
collected money, paid bills and divided the net profits between them.
The only distinction between the operations of the two corpora-
tions involved a bank loan to one of them. In connection with that
loan, papers were signed, representing to the lending bank that the
corporation owned the leases involved, and the leases were assigned
to the bank as collateral. The other corporation had no such borrow-
ing activity. This distinction, held the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, warranted ignoring the corporate existence where
no business activity was involved, but insisting upon recognition of
the corporation which had borrowed funds and entered into the
related activities, as a separate taxpayer.
The distinction made in the Paymer case was recognized a few
years later by the Tax Court in another case involving the same
brothers who were the litigants in Paymer. In Raymep Realty Corp.
Inc.,"° although it appeared that different corporations were involved,
the facts were substantially the same, and only one of several corpo-
rations engaged in loan activities. Again, this was held sufficient to
require treatment of it as a separate taxpayer, although the corporate
entities were disregarded as to the other corporations.
Subsequent Tax Court decisions in which the taxpayers have
been successful seem to have liberalized the interpretations of these
two cases. Thus, in John A. Mulligan," the court refused to tax a
corporation on a gain from a sale of real estate where the real estate
was held purely for the convenience of those interested in a probate
estate and where the corporation's income and expenses were paid
directly by the estate. At the death of the sole shareholder, the
petitioner, who was appointed the administrator of the estate, took
over the corporate stock. By direction of the Surrogate and peti-
tioner's attorney, the property remained in the name of the corpora-
tion since the leases were up for renewal, and the officials of the
Surrogate's Court did not want to upset any related plans. Petitioner
was elected president and treasurer of the corporation, other directors
were also elected, and several meetings were held. During the years
in question, rent was collected from the properties and was deposited
by the petitioner in the estate's bank account, which was the only
account maintained in connection with the property. Checks payable
to the corporation were endorsed by the petitioner and deposited in
that account. Funds to meet expenses incurred in managing the
property were withdrawn by the petitioner from the estate funds
10 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 262 (1948).
11 16 T.C. 1489 (1951).
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held in the same bank account. In fact, all obligations, including
mortgage payments, were so withdrawn on the signature of the peti-
tioner as administrator, countersigned by the bonding company for
the petitioner, and all concerned dealt with the estate as owner of
the property. In September, of 1945, all the properties were sold
and the proceeds deposited in the estate's bank account. Thereafter
the corporation did not hold title to any assets nor did it do any
business.
A tax return was filed by the corporation for the year 1945.
Against the receipts there were claimed as deductions certain ex-
penses, including the administrator's commissions as such, amortiza-
tion payments of the mortgage, and a deduction of over $47,000
described as "to estate of Thomas Mulligan, deceased-for stock."
The latter deduction offset the inclusion in receipts of the net gain
from sale of the properties.
The court stated that the facts brought the case within the
group of decisions "where the holding of bare legal title to real
property is found to be an insufficient ground for taxing income to
a corporation having no other function."' 2 This is of particular
interest -in connection with language used in certain other decisions,
discussed hereafter, where the courts have refused to disregard the
corporate existence because business had been transacted, and which
indicated that after this had once taken place, the corporate exist-
ence could no longer be disregarded.
In Henry T. Roberts"8 the taxpayer was also successful in hav-
ing the corporate veil pierced in connection with operations of a
farm. The corporation was formed for the sole purpose of taking
title to the farm, and after this had been accomplished the taxpayer
continued to conduct the farming operations as an individual until
several years later when the corporation was eventually dissolved
and the property sold. The court distinguished between the corpora-
tion, on the one hand, and the individual taxpayer, on the other, as
being distinct entities, and held that the losses resulting from the farm
operations were properly deductible by the individual as the operator
of the farm (with the rental value of the corporate-owned farm-
house living quarters being taxable to the individual as income in
the absence of any agreement between the individual and the corpo-
ration). However, the individual was not allowed deductions for
taxes, license fees, and interest payments on farm mortgages, in the
absence of a showing that he had agreed or was otherwise obligated
to make such payments-even though in fact he did make those
12 Id. at 1492.
Is 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 599 (1948).
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payments. In other words, the court did not disregard the corporate
existence entirely, but did follow the doctrine of the above cases by
holding that the income of the farming operation should be taxable
to the individual even though the property was owned by the corpo-
ration. However, the significant aspect of this case is that the court
kept the two entities separated for the purpose of distinguishing be-
tween the obligations of the property owner (the corporation) and
the obligations of the operator of the business (the individual).
In Thomas G. Wilwerth," on the contrary, the Tax Court per-
mitted the taxpayer to deduct various expenses arising out of the
operations of certain real property, although title to the realty was
held in the name of this wholly-owned corporation. Since the cor-
poration engaged in no business activities, it was held to be a sham
and was completely disregarded. Taxpayer had entered into an
agreement with another individual to have the latter operate the
property. In order to make certain that taxpayer would have no per-
sonal liability for the operations, the corporation was formed to
take title. In 1947 he demolished the improvements in the course
of renovating the building, and claimed deductions for the depre-
ciated cost of the improvements destroyed, for expenses of demoli-
tion, and for depreciation of the buildings prior to demolition.
Corporate tax returns were filed for subsequent years, which are
not involved here. The court held that the taxpayer came within the
rule of the Paymer case, and that there had not been sufficient busi-
ness activity to require treating the corporation as a taxpayer. It
emphasized that after the initial step of acquiring legal title, no other
activity had been engaged in by the corporation, which had no
bank accounts and had filed no corporate tax returns. During the
years in question the taxpayer had reported the income and ex-
penses on his individual income tax return in the same manner as
certain other real estate holdings. The court noted that in a prior
ruling it had recognized the expenditures for improvements as indi-
vidual expenditures and not corporate ones.
Similarly, in Joseph Czvizler,15 the Tax Court refused to distin-
guish between the activities of the individual and those of the cor-
poration. The tangible assets of a restaurant were owned by the
individual, who operated the business in his own name. Accordingly,
the Tax Court held that the income and losses from the restaurant
business were attributable to him, although the lease under which he
occupied the premises, and a liquor license, were held for con-
venience by the corporation. At the time of taking over the restau-
14 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 987 (1955).
15 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 386 (1953).
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rant the taxpayer had intended to operate it as a sole proprietor, but
found that the owner of the property on which the business was
operated was unwilling to consent to an assignment of the lease by
a corporation which was the tenant and which held the liquor license.
It, therefore, was necessary for the taxpayer to buy the stock of
this corporation in order to acquire the lease and the license. The
record showed minutes of directors meetings recording transfer of
the stock, electing the taxpayer and his representative as officers and
directors, naming the taxpayer as operating manager of the bar, and
fixing taxpayer's compensation at an amount which represented vir-
tually all of the anticipated profits. However, the corporation did not
otherwise carry on any active business and did not receive any in-
come or incur any expenses.
In Jackson v. Commissioner" the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed a Tax Court decision to disregard the cor-
porate entity. In an involved transaction, a "dummy" corporation
was used to transfer wife-taxpayer's interest in assets to her separate
control in order to protect her against creditors of husband-tax-
payer." The court held the case resembled the Paymer case more
closely than National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, a where the tax-
payer was successful. It quoted from the decision of the Supreme
Court in Moline, indicating that business activity or intention to
carry on business activity is decisive. It then determined that no
such intention or activity existed in the case before the court.
16 233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956).
17 Husband and wife taxpayers together owned one-third of stock of Empire
Industries Inc., each of two other shareholders owning one-third. Empire owned
several subsidiaries acquired through loans personally guaranteed by husband-tax-
payer. Friction arose from his attempts to reduce the amount of this contingent
liability. Thereafter corporation Lewis of Delaware was formed to acquire one-third
of the assets of Empire, and to be operated by the Jacksons (the taxpayer). They
proceeded to exchange their one-third interest for all of the Lewis stock by a series of
transactions involving two corporations, Dumelle and Belgrade, which they wholly
owned and controlled. The decision indicates that -they first created Dumelle and then
transferred their one-third interest in Empire to Dumelle for all of Dumelle's capital
stock. Thereafter Belgrade, a pre-existing corporation wholly owned by wife-tax-
payer and which had never conducted any business, purchased the Empire stock from
Dumelle in exchange for $1,000 cash and $469,000 in interest bearing notes. Finally
Belgrade received all of the stock of Lewis in exchange for the one-third interest in
Empire previously held by Lewis. The activities of the two corporations, Belgrade
and Dumelle, apparently were limited, Dumelle merely receiving Empire stock from
the taxpayers and selling it to Belgrade, while Belgrade's activities were to purchase
the Empire stock from Dumelle and exchange it for the Lewis stock with Empire, and
hold the Lewis stock. The taxpayer's purpose in creating Dumelle and Belgrade was
to insure that wife-taxpayer, as owner of all of the stock of Belgrade, would have as
her sole and separate property, free of any claim of husband-taxpayer's creditors, any
future increment in the value of the stock of the Lewis company. The court found
that although Belgrade was intended to and did become owner of the Lewis stock, it
did not exercise any functions with respect to management.
18 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
CORPORATE ENTITY
There is a variation on the theme in Paul C. F. Vietzke. 9 Tax-
payer had been fraudulently induced to buy shares in a newly formed
insurance company. The Tax Court, in allowing the loss as one re-
sulting from "theft," pierced the corporate veil, stating that "The
corporate entity . . . [was] . . . a device to route the subscriber's
money into the [promoter's] pocket." The net result, of course, was
to convert what would otherwise have been a worthless security
capital loss into a deductible theft loss.
In United States v. Lanterman,2° the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan rendered a decision supporting the contention of the taxpayer
that the corporate entity should be disregarded. The U.S. Attorney
General's office 'had contended that income was taxable to the
corporation. A decedent had owned several parcels of real estate in
the vicinity of Detroit, and all of the heirs resided outside of the
State of Michigan. For convenience in securing signatures when-
ever leases, deeds, mortgages, and other documents were to be exe-
cuted, the heirs formed a corporation and transferred their respec-
tive interests in the real estate to that corporation. Their intent was
to sell the properties as soon as market conditions were favorable.
Meanwhile, leases were entered into by the corporation.
All stock was issued to an individual who had been the dece-
dent's attorney, and who continued to act for the estate and the heirs,
as well as for the corporation. Otherwise, however, he had no in-
terest in the estate or the corporation. Since a management firm
was employed by the corporation for the purpose of handling the
real property, nothing was ever done by the corporation in this
respect. Decisions were made by the heirs, rather than the board of
directors, and the 'heirs received, from time to time, not only their
respective shares of income, but all proceeds of any sales of prop-
erty. No income was reinvested.
The Michigan court held that the corporate entity would be dis-
regarded on the grounds that the corporation was the alter ego of the
heirs and acted solely as their agent, distinguishing Moline in that
there the corporation was not the alter ego of the sole owner. Never-
theless, it is interesting to note that there was a business purpose for
the formation of the corporation here, namely, the business con-
venience of the heirs. In addition, all property was leased in the
name of the corporation, which received the rentals before turning
them over to the heirs, and which executed deeds in the name of
the corporation.
The above cases appear to have reaffirmed the doctrine adopted
19 37 T.C. 504 (1961).
20 321 Mich. 708, 33 N.W.2d 126 (1948).
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by certain other cases before the Moline decision. As noted in the
opinion of the Supreme Court in the Moline case, certiorari was
granted because of conflicting decisions in appellate courts of various
circuits. The various Circuit Courts of Appeal and also the Tax
Court had previously disregarded the corporate entity for the bene-
fit of shareholders.'
This summary of cases in which the taxpayer has been
successful is sufficient to illustrate that the decisions are not en-
tirely consistent. As will be seen, those cases in which the taxpayer
was unsuccessful probably add to the confusion. However, none of
the decisions favoring the Tax Collector denies the existence of the
rule that the corporate entity will be disregarded where the corpora-
tion is a mere sham, not formed for a business purpose and engaging
in no business activities. The question in each instance is one of ap-
plying the doctrine to a particular set of facts. Accordingly, the facts
involved and the language used by the courts in denying relief
to the taxpayer-shareholders are interesting.
Taxpayer Unsuccessful
In accepting and following the rule of the Paymer case, the
Tax Court has been quite consistent and impartial. In Tatem
Wofford 22 a state court had held, in settling a civil suit between two
shareholders to prevent one of them from taking advantage of the
other, that the corporation in question was merely a trustee for
the benefit of co-owners. The Tax Court quite properly distinguished
between the effect of this decision on the civil rights of the indi-
viduals involved, on the one hand, and the income tax implications,
on the other hand. The corporation had operated the business long
before trouble arose between the litigants and was therefore not to
be disregarded for tax purposes.
In Abraham J. Halprin,2" the taxpayer had formed a corpora-
tion to take title to real estate obtained on foreclosure, in order to
protect him from personal liability in connection with the financing
of the real estate. Although no corporate Stock certificates were is-
21 See, e.g., 112 West 59th Street Corp. v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 397 (1933) ; United
States v. Brager Building & Land Corp., 124 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1941) ; North Jersey
Title Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 898; Inland Development Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 120 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1936) ; Carling Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A.
493 (1940); Mayer v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 117 (1957); Abrams Sons' Realty
Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 653 (1939); Thrift Realty Co. v. Commissioner,
29 B.T.A. 545 (1933); Moro Realty Holding Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 1135
(1932), aff'd, 65 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1933); Forshav v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 537
(1930).
22 5 T.C. 1152 (1945).
2s 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 789 (1945), aff'd, 154 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1946).
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sued, and the corporation had no office, employees, or assets other
than the title to the realty in question, the corporation had been
formed for the business purpose of protecting taxpayer against per-
sonal liability, rentals were made in the name of the corporation,
and appropriate payments were made by the corporation. In light
of these facts the decision of the Tax Court, issued only a few
weeks after the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the
Paymer case, to insist upon treating operating losses as those of
the corporation seems quite consistent.
In Loula Mae Harrison4 a dormant corporation had been ac-
quired by the taxpayer in order to increase borrowing capacity
through involved arrangements. Because of this clear business pur-
pose, the Tax Court insisted upon gains being taxed to the cor-
poration rather -than the shareholder.
The reasoning of the Tax Court seems less clear in the case of
L. B. Whitfield.25 There some of Mr. Whitfield's real estate was lo-
cated in Florida, and in order to avoid the need for ancillary probate
proceedings at Mr. Whitfield's death, his attorneys had him form a
Florida corporation, which took title to the realty. Pursuant to an
arrangement with creditors, the rents received were turned over to
another corporation controlled by Whitfield, just as he had similarly
turned over rent monies to the same payee prior to the formation of
the Florida corporation. Although new leases were negotiated by the
Florida corporation and it subsequently sold some of the real estate
at Whitfield's direction, it had no other assets, was never listed in
any directory, and had no officers or employees. Because of the
negotiation of leases and sales of real estate, it was held to have car-
ried on a business, so that it could not be disregarded as a separate
taxpayer. This almost seems a return to the strict rule of the Paymer
case, rather than the liberalized rule of the Wilwerth case. While
the distinction may be that Mr. Wilwerth did not actually engage in
business activities, his corporation seems to have been formed for
a business purpose, namely, to protect him against liability in con-
nection with turning his operations over to a new manager.
At this point some consideration shall be given to the Circuit
Court of Appeals decisions in which the taxpayer has been unsuccess-
ful when attempting to have the corporate entity disregarded. No-
tably most of these cases arose in the Second Circuit, possibly
because the Paymer case was decided there, and because the tax-
payer's position was also sustained by the court in the Jackson case.
24 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 782 (1947), aff'd, on a different issue, 173 F.2d 736
(5th Cir. 1949).
25 14 T.C. 776 (1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1951).
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In any event, five of the ten cases decided by the Circuit Court of
Appeals are found in the Second Circuit.
In Sun-Herald Corp. v. Duggan26 the facts differed from those
of previously considered cases in that the corporation in question
had been actively engaged in business prior to the death of its con-
trolling shareholder. His will directed that all the assets of the
corporation be transferred to its tax-exempt successor. Through inad-
vertence certain debentures were not transferred. The litigated ques-
tion was whether or not the transferor corporation should be taxed
on the income of the assets retained inadvertently where, in fact,
such income was turned over to the successor tax-exempt organiza-
tion promptly on receipt, and where there was language in the in-
struments affecting the assets, indicating an intent to transfer all
assets of the corporation. The court refused to disregard the exist-
ence of the transferee.
While it might be possible to treat this case as unimportant
in view of the factual distinction, the temptation to quote the lan-
guage of Judge Learned Hand is too great to resist:
The law of corporations allows the fabrication of such elaborately
involuted jural persons as Munsey seems to have thought important inhis affairs; and out of them authentic rights and duties will emerge.
Although there are occasions when courts will brush them aside, and
decide controversies as though only the human factors had been con-
cerned, when there is no such occasion, the rights and duties that
result must be respected and enforced like others. There was no
reason which forbade the persons in charge of these transactions to
treat the notes as property of the plaintiffs, and not only are we justified
in taking them at their word, but we have no alternative. It is idle
to ask us to look "realistically" at what they did; that is a word al-
ways indicating either an inability to discover, or unwillingness to tell,
the determining factors, we study always to eschew it. It is true that
these persons had it easily in their hands to exempt this money from
taxation, and it is strange indeed that they did not use their power;but use it they did not; on the contrary they gave the most positive
evidence that they did not mean to take those steps which alone would
exempt it. We cannot now unravel the web they then wove, glad as
we might be to do so. 27
In National Investor Corp. v. Hoey 8 the case in question in-
volved a parent corporation wishing to merge with several subsidiar-
ies. The interested parties transferred the stock of the subsidiaries
to another corporation which had neither assets nor liabilities. Dur-
26 160 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1947).
27 Id. at 478.
28 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
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ing the time that the plan of merger was being worked out and
submitted to shareholders of the parent corporation, the new owner
of the subsidiaries engaged in no activity except to receive and hold
the stock of the subsidiaries. When the corporation's consolidation
plan was rejected by the parent corporation's shareholders, the new
company was liquidated. The Court of Appeals held that the cor-
porate entity of the new company which temporarily held the stock
of the subsidiaries could not be disregarded because the use of the
holding company as a means of achieving consolidation and holding
title to the securities "was a 'business' activity." This was the same
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which, in the later fackson
case, found that there was no such business purpose or activity.
There the taxpayer's purpose was to protect the interest of Mrs.
Jackson (taxpayer-wife) from creditors of taxpayer-husband as to
any increment in value occuring after the transfer to the cor-
poration. Apparently, the corporation continued to hold the stock
of the subsidiary after the transfer.
Given v. Commissioner 9 is of little interest. The corporation
in question had owned and disposed of other properties before the
period involved in litigation. Substantially all of the stock was owned
by Given. He and three other individuals agreed to buy a building,
title to which was taken in the name of the corporation. The cor-
poration paid a portion of the purchase price from funds deposited
in its bank account by -the interested individuals. A corporate note
secured the balance of the price. Some of Given's stock was then
redistributed among the other interested persons. About a year
later Given and another individual bought out the balance of the
shareholders. Operating expenditures were made from the cor-
poration's funds with the necessary amounts being contributed by
the shareholders from time to time. All payments in relation to the
building, except the purchase of the interest of shareholders, were
made by corporate check, and all leases were executed in the corpo-
ration's name. Accordingly, the refusal of the court to disregard the
corporate entity is easily understood.
In Skarda v. Commissioner ° it was the Appellate Court for
the Tenth Circuit which insisted upon recognizing the existence of a
corporation that had actually operated a newspaper, filed necessary
information returns, and maintained bank accounts, even though
there had never been meetings of shareholders or directors, no by-
laws had been adopted, and no shares of stock had ever been is-
sued. The court stated:
29 238 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1956).
30 250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1957).
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For tax purposes, where the purpose for the creation of the
corporation is a business one or the creation is followed by business
activity, the corporate entity will not be disregarded. 81
The court also stated:
Where the purpose for creating the corporation is to gain an
advantage under the law of the state of incorporation, relieve the
stockholders from personal liability for debts 'created by the corpora-
tion, or serve the creator's personal convenience, so long as that
purpose is the equivalent of a business activity, or is followed by
the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation re-
mains a separate taxable entity. Where the taxpayer, for business pur-
pose of his own, adopts the corporate advantage to do business requires
acceptance of the tax disadvantages.8 2
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was confronted
with the problem in O'Neill v. Commissioner." There the taxpayer-
shareholder contended that advances which he had made to his
corporation should be treated as business losses because, in ef-
fect, the losses were incurred in the operation of his own business.
The Tax Court had held that these were capital advances and had
refused to disregard the corporate entity. In affirming this position
the Appellate Court recognized that the corporate structure might
be disregarded where the purpose of its creation was not a busi-
ness purpose and was not followed by business activity, but went
on to say:
On the other hand, where the corporation is created for a business
activity or the creation is followed by business activity, the corporation
must be recognized as a separate entity. 84
We find ourselves back in the Second Circuit in Ralph Wattley
v. Commissioner,5 where the taxpayer was a licensed real estate
broker who became sole shareholder of a corporation authorized to
conduct a real estate brokerage business. Other brokers also pur-
ported to act for the corporation from time -to time, and received
compensation by way of a percentage of each commission earned.
While the corporation never paid any income tax, returns were filed
in its name, and the taxpayer's individual returns showed no income
from the corporation during those years. The court refused to dis-
regard the corporate entity for the purpose of treating any commis-
sion received as belonging to the taxpayer, rather than to the
corporation, and declined to allow him the income-splitting benefits
of the Internal Revenue Code for services performed as the cor-
81 Id. at 433-4.
82 Id. at 434. (Emphasis added.)
88 271 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1959).
84 Id. at 49.
35 275 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1959), aft'd, 298 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1962).
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poration's agent. The services involved negotiating a lease over a
period when negotiations were being conducted in the name of the
corporation and on its letterhead. However, the court did recognize
taxpayer's right to terminate his relationship with the corporation,
and thereafter he was entitled to prorate commissions received as an
individual broker, not over the entire period but over the period
from termination of the relationship with the corporation.
Again, it was the Second Circuit which denied relief in Com-
missioner v. State-Adams Corporation.6 A Mrs. Whitehouse was sole
trustee and sole income beneficiary of a trust of certain real property
located in Chicago. It appeared that at her death the property would
be distributed to her descendants per stirpes, that two of the
recipients would be aliens prohibited by Illinois law from owning
real estate for more than a limited time, and that part of the owner-
ship would become vested in minor beneficiaries.
Accordingly, when Mrs. Whitehouse was 81 years of age, tax-
payer corporation was formed under Illinois law, and the real
estate in question was transferred to it in exchange for all of its
stock. At that time, the realty was rented to a department store
for stipulated rentals through the year 1994, and the lease was trans-
ferred to it in exchange for its promissory note payable to Mrs.
Whitehouse as trustee. The interest on the note was equivalent to
the amount of rent received from the department store. At the time
the corporation was formed Mrs. Whitehouse was advised by her
attorney -that the new arrangement would not affect "the present
crediting to her account" with a sum equal to the total rent of the
property. After incorporation, rent checks were made payable by
the tenant to the corporation, which in turn transmitted them to
Mrs. Whitehouse's account as trustee. After the death of Mrs.
Whitehouse the rental payments received by the corporation con-
tinued to be transferred to Mrs. Whitehouse's bank, but instead
of being delivered to her, they were delivered directly to the share-
holders, who succeeded to the shares on termination of the trust. The
lease was a "net lease" under which all of the usual duties of owner-
ship and management were on the tenant. In denying the corpora-
tion's contention that the corporation should be disregarded under
the rule of the Paymer case, the court pointed out that the stock-
holder here intended to make the corporation the true owner, and
that the directors and officers could have exercised control without the
consent of the shareholder. In footnote 2 of the case, the court
points out that:
When Congress has desired to give taxpayers the benefit of using
the corporate form without paying a corporate income tax, it has known
36 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844.
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how to do so specifically and directly. Compare the election as to
taxable status given 'Certain small business corporations' by I.R.C.
1954, Subchapter S, §§ 1371-77. .... 37
In Hagist Ranch Inc. v. Commissioner8 the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that the fact that a corporation was
formed for the convenience of its shareholders was a factor in
recognizing the corporate ownership, where the corporation was
formed to take over, operate and liquidate certain assets of a bank-
rupt, and distribute proceeds to creditors, there having been consid-
erable operating activity involved.
In Greer v. Commissioner9 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit faced the question of whether or not the corporation in ques-
tion was an agent of the joint venture made up of three individuals
so that they might deduct losses from its activities, or whether
recognition had to be given to the corporation as a taxpayer. This,
of course, presents a different problem from the cases previously con-
sidered, where the issue was whether or not the corporation was a
"dummy." Nevertheless, the court was asked to analyze similar
facts, since there were none of the usual evidences of a principal and
agent relationship. The court held that since the taxpayers had not
shown that in fact the corporation was merely their agent, they had
not sustained the burden placed up them, and said:
Whether the corporation operates in the name and for the account
of the principal, binds the principal by its actions, transmits money
received to the principal, and where the receipt of income is attribut-
able to the services of the employees of the principal and to assets
belonging to the principal are some of the relevant considerations in
determining whether a true agency exists. If the corporation is a true
agent, its relation to its principal must not be dependent upon the
fact that it is owned by the principal, if such is the case. Its business
purpose must be the carrying on of the normal duties of an agent. 40
The court specifically noted that the doctrine of Lucas v.
Earl,41 that assignment of the fruit without the tree is not effec-
tive for shifting income, does not mean that income will be taxed to
the owner of property when in fact it is the income of the operations
of a taxpayer other than the owner. This is, of course, merely a
restatement of the doctrines applied by the Tax Court in several
of the cases where the taxpayer was successful in having the cor-
porate entity disregarded, as for example, the Roberts and Czivzler
cases. It is interesting mainly because of the reference to Lucas v.
37 Id. at 399.
38 295 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1961).
39 334 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1964), affirming, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mern. 998 (1962).
40 Id. at 23-24.
41 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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Earl and its refusal of taxpayer's suggestion that the doctrine of
that case be applied inversely.
Like the Greer case, Worth Steamship Corporation42 involved
the question of whether or not the taxpayer corporation operated
as an owner or as an agent for individuals. The Tax Court held that
although title to a ship was in the corporation, it was clear from a
pertinent agreement that the corporation held title for the benefit of
the individuals, and operated the ship as manager for the individuals,
turning over all profits to the individuals and being paid a fixed
amount as compensation. Although the taxpayers were successful
in establishing the agency arrangement in this instance, the case
was not discussed with the other Tax Court decisions favoring the
taxpayers since it turned on the agency question rather than on a
determination as to whether or not the corporate existence should
be ignored as being 'a mere sham.
ACQUISITION OF CORPORATION TO AcQuIRE ITS ASSETS
In addition to the foregoing cases where the courts were asked
to disregard the corporate entity because it was a mere sham and
because there was no business purpose or activity, there has been
another type of case where the corporate entity has been disregarded.
This category involves the acquisition of a corporation with the in-
tent to liquidate it promptly in order to acquire the assets of that
corporation. In other words, the buyer is not interested in the cor-
poration except for the purpose of acquiring its assets. Considerably
less space will be devoted to a discussion of this doctrine, since the
guidelines are better settled than those affecting the previously dis-
cussed cases, and to some extent have been made obsolete by legisla-
tive action. Nevertheless, some mention must be made of the situa-
tion since it properly falls within the scope of this paper, as an
instance where the corporate entity is disregarded for the benefit of
the taxpaper.
The leading case involved determination of the cost basis of the
underlying assets acquired through purchase of the stock of the
owner corporation, and liquidation of that corporation. In Kimbell-
Diamond Milling Co.43 the Commissioner unsuccessfully sought to
have the procedure taxed as a "single transaction" so as to deny
to the purchasing corporation the right to carry over a basis in excess
of what it had paid for the stock of the liquidated corporation. The
42 7 T.C. 654 (1946).




same principle was applied in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co." and
Kanawha Gas and Utilities Co. v. Commissioner4 5 to give the ac-
quiring corporation the benefit of its cost, where that exceeded the
cost basis of the underlying assets to the original owner whose stock
it acquired. In both of these cases the surviving corporation wished
to acquire the assets of the predecessor corporate owner, and in order
to do so acquired the outstanding stock (or -the outstanding stock
and other securities in addition to assuming the liabilities) of the
predecessor. In each, the cost of thus acquiring the corporation was
more than the cost basis of the underlying assets to the corporation.
The Commissioner contended that the cost basis of the assets to
the purchaser should be restricted to the cost basis of those assets in
the hands of the prior owner. In each instance he was unsuccessful,
the courts holding that the various steps by which the control of the
subsidiary corporation was obtained and the subsidiary liquidated
constituted the purchase of the underlying assets by the surviving
corporation. In each instance the Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co.
case was cited, and the surviving corporation was permitted to use
its overall cost of acquiring the assets through the acquisition and
liquidation of the predecessor corporation as the cost basis for
the assets.
An analagous doctrine was involved in Commissioner v. Ash-
land Oil & Refining Co.,4" and H. B. Snively 7 In these cases, again,
the purchaser acquired the stock of the prior corporate owner of
the desired assets, and then liquidated that corporation in order
to acquire the underlying assets. In each instance the value of the
assets received on liquidation exceeded the cost to the surviving tax-
payer of acquisition of the controlled corporation. Both courts held
that no liquidation gain resulted under the circumstances, since in
fact there was a purchase of underlying assets.
Incidentally, in the Snively case, the court also decided that the
rule relieving the purchaser-taxpayer from realization of gain on
liquidation of the acquired corporation did not relieve that cor-
poration from liability for income received between the time that
it was acquired by the purchase and the time that it was liquidated.
The converse of the Snively and Ashland cases is found in
Ruth M. Cullen" where one of several shareholders of a corpora-
tion bought out 'the others in order to liquidate the corporation and
operate the business as a sole proprietorship. The cost ,to him of the
44 25 T.C. 408 (1955).
45 214 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954).
46 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661.
47 19 T.C. 850 (1953).
48 14 T.C. 368 (1950).
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stock acquired exceeded'the value of the liquidating distribution,
but the court denied taxpayer the right to a deductible loss because
he "had neither more nor less than he had paid for."
It is to be noted that the so-called Kimbell-Diamond rule,
as applied to corporate surviving taxpayers, has now been incor-
porated by the 1954 Internal Revenue Code in Section 334(b) (2).
However, this section does not apply to individuals acquiring cor-
porate stock in order to reach underlying assets, and as to them the
theories of the courts, in going -through form to substance, still
apply. In Estate of Suter,49 the individuals had first attempted to
buy the underlying assets from the old corporation, but had been
forced to buy the stock of the corporation instead. As planned, the
old corporation was dissolved, and its assets distributed to the in-
dividuals. The individuals then transferred the assets to a new cor-
poration, completely controlled by them, with this new corporation
assuming the liabilities for the purchase price of the stock. The Tax
Court held that the series of steps constituted a single transaction,
that is, the purchase by the new corporation of the assets of the
old. The basis of the assets in the hands of the new corporation
would therefore be the purchase price of the stock of the old cor-
poration. It further held that the individual shareholders did not
receive a dividend when the new corporation assumed liability for
the purchase price of the stock.
CRITIQUE
Perhaps the cases last mentioned, in which the stock of a cor-
poration is acquired only for the purpose of liquidating it and reach-
ing its underlying assets, are not true cases of "disregard of the
corporate entity." However they are examples of proceeding through
form to substance, and the net effect is to disregard the existence
of the predecessor corporate owner insofar as liquidation is con-
cerned, so as to recognize that the surviving taxpayer in fact merely
acquired the underlying assets desired.
The more interesting questions arise in the case where the
courts have been asked to disregard the corporate entity because it
was in fact a sham, and because the corporation had neither busi-
ness purpose nor activity. The rule does not seem to fit within gen-
erally accepted tax principles. As previously noted, a commonly
accepted principle is that the taxpayer, having had the choice of
whether or not to do business in corporate form, must be held
49 29 T.C. 244 (1947).
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responsible for his election to adopt that form.5" Any exceptions to
this rule would be expected to involve instances where application
of the rule would work an undue hardship on the taxpayer because
of circumstances beyond his control, so that he should be granted re-
lief to prevent an unfair result. This reasoning would support only a
few of the cases where the taxpayer was successful.5 ' Perhaps on
this theory the decision of the Court of Appeals of the Second Cir-
cuit in the Sun-Herald case might have been decided differently,
since it appears that -the parties in control of the situation were
guilty, at worst, of inadvertence.
In any event, if the taxpayers were to be relieved of the burdens
of the corporate existence only in such hardship cases, we would
not find the peculiar results of the decisions reviewed, which deny
relief to taxpayers because of the business purpose of a corpora-
tion in some cases, while other cases, which pay lip service to the
same doctrine, proceed to ignore the corporate entity when the
corporation was formed either to conceal assets from creditors or to
protect an individual from civil liability or to transfer assets from
the taxpayer to another to defeat creditors. 2 To deny relief where
the corporation executes leases and transfers title to property be-
cause title is held in the name of the corporation, but no other busi-
ness activity occurs,5 or where the corporation merely holds title
to stock temporarily while a merger is negotiated,54 and then to al-
low relief where the corporation is deliberately formed to protect
the taxpayer against any liability which might be incurred by his
employee in operating his business55 seems to place an undue em-
phasis on the question of whether or not unimportant activities are
undertaken in the name of the corporation, and not enough empha-
sis on the purpose for which the corporation is formed or used.
It is submitted, however, that a review of the decisions of the
Courts of Appeal, both for and against the taxpayer, seems to in-
dicate a tendency towards renunciation of the rule, or at least a ten-
50 United States v. Morris & Essex R.R. Co., 135 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1943);
Moline Properties Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Skarda v. Commis-
sioner, 250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1957).
51 See, e.g., Paul C. F. Vietzke, 37 T.C. 504 (1961). In addition, perhaps the
decision in John A. Mulligan, 16 T.C. 1489 (1951), might be included on the basis
that the taxpayers were acting pursuant to instructions of the Surrogate's Court.
52 Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945); Raymep Realty Corp.
Inc., 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 262 (1948); Thomas C. Wilwerth, 14 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 987 (1955) ; Jackson v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956).
53 Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945); Raymep Realty Corp.
Inc., 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 262 (1948); L. B. Whitfield, 14 T.C. 776 (1950).
54 National Investor's Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
5 Thomas C. Wilwerth, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 987 (1955).
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dency to restrict its application, through factual interpretations.56
There remain several doubts as to just which facts will be deemed
to justify application of the rule in the taxpayer's favor, unless he
wishes to conceal assets from his creditors, and even then, there may
be a question as to whether or not he will be allowed to treat
as individual deductions any taxes and similar items attributable to
ownership of :the property if title is in the corporation. In addition,
there is always the possibility that the language of the Supreme
Court in the Moline case, "Whether the purpose be to gain an ad-
vantage under the law of the state of incorporation or to avoid or to
comply with the demands of creditors . . ."" will result in repudia-
tion of the doctrine of the Paymer case where a corporation is
formed to conceal assets from creditors.
Nevertheless, the "court-made" law established by the cases dis-
cussed here has been on the books for over thirty years.5" Accord-
ingly, the failure of Congress to legislate the doctrine out of existence
seems to justify its continued recognition by the courts. It remains
available for those who have the inclination, and -the courage, to
make use of it.
56 Sun-Herald Corp. v. Duggan, 160 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Investor's Corp.
v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d
395 (2d Cir. 1960).
57 319 U.S. 436, at 438 (1943). (Emphasis added.) See also, Skarda v. Com-
missioner, 250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1957).
58 112 West 59th Street Corp. v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 397 (1933). Other cases can
be found in Moline Properties Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 n.1 (1943).
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